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A Feminist Approach to Citizenship
by Diemut Bubeck
Citizenship, that is, the meaning of membership in a political 
community, has been widely discussed in political and social 
theory during the last decade. 1 Feminists have contributed 
directly and indirectly to this discussion: directly through various 
critiques of malestream authors and contributions to the 
development of a 'citizenship with a feminist face', and more 
indirectly through work on maternal thinking and the ethic of 
care. Whilst Dietz has presented an early critique of the possibility 
of maternal citizenship2 — that is, citizenship based on maternal 
thinking — care theorists have only just started moving into 
political theory, but have not explicitly addressed conceptions of 
citizenship. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to argue for the





























































































possibility and desirability of a feminist conception of citizenship 
based on the theory of care, and to point out what kind of shape 
such a theory should take. In section I, I shall present the 
dimensions along which thin and thick conceptions of citizenship 
vary. With respect to these dimensions, I then argue in section II 
that feminists will need to develop thick rather than thin 
conceptions of citizenship. Section III will be devoted to meeting 
Dietz's arguments against maternal citizenship, and section IV to 
indicating how the practice of care can form the basis for a thick 
feminist conception of citizenship. I conclude the paper by 
suggesting that care be included in conceptions of citizenship as a 
general citizen's obligation (section V).
I — Thin and thick conceptions of citizenship
The contrast between thin and thick conceptions of 
citizenship, following that between thin and thick conceptions of 
justice or of political morality in the liberal-communitarian 
debate, suggests that there is a straightforward way of 
distinguishing between them, and the implication of discussions 
generally is that there is, since the distinction itself is not 
problematised. Thus Walzer's recent thesis is that the distinction 
between 'thin and thick' refers to that between universalist but 
minimalist, and particularist, locally situated, and 'maximal' 
conceptions of morality.3 As far as conceptions of citizenship are 
concerned, however, given the variety of conceptions that have 
been discussed, no unidimensional contrast is possible: thick 
conceptions 'fill in the picture' along a number of relatively 
independent, even if related dimensions. In the following, I shall 
look at six such dimensions. Note that the terminology of 'thin 
and thick' should not be read to imply categorical, exclusive 





























































































dimensions along which conceptions of citizenship vary, and 
between whose contrasting poles any kind of mixture may be 
found in conceptions of citizenship. The thinness or thickness of 
conceptions of citizenship is therefore a matter of degree on each 
dimension and of the overall number of thin or thick locations on 
these dimensions rather than a categorical question. Conceptions 
can also often be found to combine elements from both sides of the 
contrasts.
The first two contrasts relate to conceptions about the 
citizens themselves. First, thin conceptions tend to see the citizen 
as a holder of rights, whilst thick conceptions see her as having 
characteristic obligations and virtues. Invariably, most 
conceptions will recognise that citizenship involves both rights or 
privileges and obligations and/or virtues, but their focus often lies 
on either one or the other side, rights or obligations, and it is this 
tendency which allows us to think of them as thin or thick. 
Secondly, citizenship may be seen as a status which confers certain 
powers onto those who have it or as active participation in the 
political life of the community. Thin conceptions based on status 
do not require any particular type of action from citizens: it is up to 
citizens whether or not and how they use their powers, given their 
general conformance to the rules of the community. Thick 
conceptions, by contrast, focus on the performance expected from 
a good citizen. This distinction is often used to demarcate liberal 
from participatory models of democracy, but also to contrast 
liberal with civic republican models of citizenship. The first two 
contrasts thus centre on the citizen as either 'passive' and rights- 
holding (but potentially active) or as active.4 They are distinct, 
however, although closely related: the first one refers to the basic 
concepts used in the characterisation of a citizen's moral status 
and the second to the inclusion of certain types of performance in
4 See, e.g., Walzer (1989), Parry (1991), Smith (1993) and Kymlicka & 




























































































the conception of citizenship. Kantian type citizenship, for 
example, is thick according to the first, but thin according to the 
second dimension, although most conceptions would be thin or 
thick on both dimensions.
The following two dimensions refer to the conception of the 
state in relation to the citizen. Thirdly, then, the state can be seen 
primarily as a threat to citizens from which they need to be 
protected by being awarded certain rights, or it can be seen as 
primarily enabling and enhancing the life of citizens in various 
ways. Invariably, the state will be seen as both on both sides — 
even libertarians agree that state-imposed law and order enables 
the exercise of freedom, and even civic republicans recognise the 
threat of tyranny — but the stress often lies on one side or the 
other, and this location will influence in turn the thinness or 
thickness of conceptions of citizenship. Fourthly, the state may be 
seen as neutral with regard to conceptions of the good life or as 
embodying and realising conceptions of the good life. This 
contrast stems from the distinction between liberal and 
communitarian theories, but it also provides us with a further 
dimension along which citizenship, and particularly active 
citizenship can be conceived. If the state is neutral and impartial, 
then participation in politics and the political sphere involves the 
ability to abstract from and leave behind the conceptions of the 
good life that citizens happen to have: political argument will only 
be possible if common, but necessarily impartial bases are found. 
Engagement in politics is thus clearly distinguished from everyday 
life which is informed by these varying conceptions of the good 
life. If the state is realising the good life, on the other hand, 
engagement in politics is more closely linked with and informed by 
conceptions of the good life, and citizens enter politics without 
having to abstract from their particular ones.5 Depending on how
5 Such a closer link does not exclude the possibility of value pluralism 
within a political community, but there are different ways of locating 
such pluralism within it: Walzer, e.g., conceives of it as linked to




























































































the state is seen in relation to the citizen, then, conceptions of 
citizenship tend to vary: what makes thin conceptions thin is at 
least partly a particular view of the state as a distinct or even 
antagonistic entity — typically a liberal or libertarian position — 
whilst thick conceptions are thick because they typically see the 
state as much more organically part of, and expressive of, the 
political, moral and social life of a community.6
The last two dimensions refer to attitudes towards the 
notion of the political and to styles of inquiry. Fifthly, then, 
citizenship can be seen as restricted to the political sphere, or as 
reaching beyond the political realm into social and individual life. 
Thin conceptions, which confine citizenship to the realm of the 
political, draw a clear distinction between the political and the 
non-political or between public and private life (or both), whilst 
the boundaries between political, social and individual life are 
much less clear, reinterpreted or even consciously rejected in thick 
conceptions. In thin conceptions, there are parts of individual and 
social life which are 'private' — which concern citizens not as 
citizens but as persons independently of their membership in a 
political community — and which are not to be interfered with by 
political decisions. Often, the political and the non-political are 
also seen as having diametrically opposed characteristics: the 
political is the realm of the universal and of rational argument, 
whilst the non-political is the realm of the particular, of emotion 
and of partial attachments and action. Liberals, civic republicans 
and those writers by whom they are inspired such as Aristotle, 
Machiavelli or Rousseau tend insist on such exclusive 
characteristics of the political in contradistinction to the non­
various sub-communities or groups (Walzer 1994), whilst identity- 
politics theorists have linked it to membership of various oppressed 
groups (Young 1989, 1990).





























































































political.7 What, then, does it mean for thick conceptions to reach 
'beyond' the political? There are at least three ways in which this 
phrase can be interpreted. First, and minimally, we might say that 
thick conceptions reach into social and individual life in that some 
of the citizens' rights and/or obligations do so: social or economic 
rights may be seen as an instance, as well as Tory proposals in 
Britain about good citizenship extending to participation in 
voluntary care, protection schemes or even policing in one's 
neighbourhood. In this interpretation, the boundary between the 
political and the non-political is, by implication, clear and 
relatively traditionally drawn, but transcended. There is, 
however, a sense in which such transcendence also changes this 
boundary de facto, since issues or activities which used to be 
thought of as private actually do become part of political 
decisionmaking and expectations — a fact which has certainly not 
escaped libertarian sensibilities. In the second interpretation, the 
narrow definition of the political is explicitly questioned. What is 
transcended here is a narrow interpretation of the political: issues 
which used to be thought of as private, and hence non-political, 
are claimed to be political, and activism or activities which were 
not traditionally conceived of as political are claimed to be such. 
Marxist, socialist, feminist, anti-racist, and lesbian and gay 
politics and arguments are instances of this type of 
transcendence.8 Thirdly, the distinction between the political and
7 Arendt (1958) provides an extreme example for the civic republican 
tradition (cf. also Pocock 1992 and Okin 1992 for a critique of Pocock); 
Rawls (1993) retains a strict distinction between the political and the 
non-political, to which Okin (1994) replies critically.
8 It is worth noting the complete misnomer of 'new social movements' 
for some of these movements which have advanced these arguments 
(excluding the 'older' marxist and socialist movements which have 
long been recognised as political and fit easily into the class-based left- 
right spectrum of modern politics). The misnomer is based on a 
narrow interpretation of the political and overlooks the fact that these 
movements clearly had political aims, but were in the difficult




























































































the non-political may be questioned itself. According to this 
interpretation, there are no clear boundaries between the political 
and the non-political. Such claims can be made on abstract, 
ontological grounds, such as by post-modernists, or they can be 
made on empirical grounds. The paradigm empirical ground is 
that of democratic political communities, and the claim is that in 
such communities the very boundary between the political and the 
non-political will itself be contested because different groups will 
want to draw it in different ways and will challenge it in various 
ways at various times: the new 'social' movements, a typically 
democratic phenomenon, bear witness to this point. What is 
political, therefore, may be determined from the top in non- 
democratic communities, but not in democratic ones, since their 
very structure does not allow such a determination.9 If, then, a 
categorical and narrow, minimalist notion of the political is 
transcended by theorists in these ways, citizenship will in its turn 
tend to involve much more than in the thin conceptions.
Sixthly, and lastly, the method of inquiry about citizenship 
can either be a 'top down' abstract derivation from other values or 
a 'bottom up' inquiry into the interrelations between the political, 
social and individual life in a political community and their import 
for citizenship. This is again a somewhat artificial contrast 
because both thin and thick theorists no doubt use both methods, 
but it is nevertheless striking that some theorists tend to use one 
more than the other. Thin theorists are typically preoccupied with 
rights, liberty, autonomy or equality, deriving their conceptions of 
citizenship from such premises, 10 whilst thick theorists are much 
more concretely interested in the actual functioning of political 
communities and the conditions that have to be met to allow them
position of having to establish their aims and activities as political at 
the same time.
9 Young's redefinition of 'private' and 'public' is flexible enough to 





























































































to flourish, 11 and it is from this type of considerations that the 
nature of citizenship is then derived. The 'bottom up' method will 
obviously lead theorists towards thick conceptions: it is the 
question about the well-functioning and flourishing of political 
communities, notably democratic ones, 12 which prompts theorists 
to do much more filling out of details, and also to move beyond the 
narrowly defined political realm into social and individual 
preconditions, given that there are interrelations which cannot be 
neglected in this kind of inquiry. Liberal presumptions about the 
neutrality of the state and the universal nature of politics, by 
contrast, will lead liberals to keep their hands off this type of 
inquiry, since it is certain to lead to normative demands directed at 
citizens, hence a thicker conception of citizenship.13 The fifth and 
sixth contrasts, then, are linked in that the inquiry into 
preconditions leads very easily to a move 'beyond the political'. 
They are also distinct, however, since civic republicans clearly use 
the thick method, but usually endorse very categorical distinctions 
between the political and the non-political, even if the political is 
conceived of differently from — more thickly than — typical 
liberal conceptions.14
11 See, e.g., Oldfield (1990).
12 Parekh (1993).
13 This fact is illustrated by the few liberals who did follow up this 
question and who, as a result, have ended up with what might be 
called thick liberal conceptions of citizenship. The price they have to 
pay for these conceptions is to drop the assumption of the neutrality of 
the state and the public-private dichotomy or a clear delineation of the 
political from the non-political (see esp. Macedo 1990, 1992, and 
Galston 1991). Note also that the British Idealists, and the 'New 
Liberalism' in early twentieth century British politics in its wake, had a 
much thicker conception of citizenship than liberalism after the 
Second World War (see Vincent & Plant 1984).
14 This point reflects the fact that there are several ways in which thick 
conceptions of citizenship move 'beyond' the political, not all of which 




























































































In conclusion, what is striking about the contrasts is how 
pluridimensional the concept of citizenship is and how difficult it 
is, therefore, to classify conceptions as obviously either thin or 
thick. Apart from minimalist libertarian conceptions of 
citizenship, no conceptions fall consistently on the thin or thick 
side: civic republicans generally fall on the thick side, but find 
themselves also on the thin side because of their categorical 
distinction between the political and the non-political, whilst 
welfare state liberals, although generally on the thin side, will find 
themselves on the thick side if they endorse social rights. 15 
Conservative and left conceptions vary generally, but both will 
tend to be on the thick side. What can be said about particular 
conceptions, then, is that they tend to be thick if they are located 
more consistently on the thick side, and tend to be thin if more on 
the thin side of the contrasts. Hence the attempt to reduce these 
dimensions to a straightforward, unidimensional distinction 
between thin and thick conceptions, is inappropriate and in fact 
quite misleading.
II — Why feminist conceptions 
of citizenship should be thick
Should a feminist conception of citizenship be thin or thick? 
It seems to me that the features of thick conceptions are generally 
more hospitable to feminist inquiry and concerns than those of thin 
ones. I shall argue this point by looking at the dimensions 
discussed in the first part in reverse order.
First of all, the last two dimensions are most important and 
also most germane to a specifically feminist approach to 
citizenship. The 'thick' inquiry into the preconditions of citizenship 
invites the theorist to do what feminist political theorists have a




























































































habit of doing all the time: it looks at what political, but also social 
and individual conditions allow a political community to function, 
what, e.g., encourages or discourages active political 
participation by citizens or what social or individual relations 
must obtain for citizens to be able to be good citizens. From the 
question how citizenship is possible, however, there is a small step 
to the question how the citizenship of various groups is possible. 
This question, in its turn, allows the critical discussion of theorists 
of the past. The latter, from Plato to Hegel, have often been quite 
explicit about the fact that citizenship was to be possible only for 
some, invariably men, because others had to take over other 
functions which also had to be fulfilled for a political community to 
flourish: the citizenship of some, particularly active citizenship, 
was based on radically unequal distributions on the one hand of 
resources such as free time or leisure and wealth, which can buy 
the time and work of others, and on the other hand of the burden 
of work. These distributions are not part of the political realm and 
can only be addressed by focusing on the social structure of a 
political community. In the age of supposedly genuine democratic 
citizenship, formally inclusive of all, 16 the question how citizenship 
is to be possible for all instead of for some at the expense of others 
becomes an urgent problem. The solution to this problem implies 
looking at social divisions of work and resources between various 
social groups and thus at the reasons for the continued (structural) 
exclusion of certain groups from the realm of politics. Feminists 
are not the only ones making this theoretical move: marxists and 
socialists have made it before them, and anti-racists are making it 
at the same time. Argument in this vein, therefore, is common to 
all theorists who try to understand the conditions of socially 
oppressed groups, given that the exclusion may not be — and 
generally is not in the twentieth century — straightforwardly 
political. Such argument may be in danger of focusing too much
16 Note that universal inclusion is far from being realised even in the 



























































































- l i ­
on the specific conditions which make equal citizenship possible for 
certain groups, whilst the danger in the more traditional civic 
republicans and communitarians is the opposite one of only 
looking at the general conditions. Thick conceptions of citizenship, 
however, can and should imply a focus on both, general and 
specific conditions, and this is why thick conceptions — provided 
they are genuinely democratic — are more hospitable to feminist 
inquiry.
The move 'beyond' the political in thick conceptions of 
citizenship, in the various interpretations I have given of it above, 
is equally important to a feminist approach and a result of the 
thick method of inquiry into preconditions. Specifically the 
categorical distinctions between the political and the non-political 
and the public and private must generally be suspect. As has been 
pointed out by many before, women have generally been excluded 
from politics for most of Western history. This exclusion has often 
if not in most cases either taken the form of assigning to them 
properties which were opposed to those of 'real' citizens who 
participated in politics — lack of reason, emotionality, lacking 
grasp of the universal, a sexed body — or the form of locating 
them in the spere of domestic life and care which was defined in 
exclusive contrast to the political and public sphere. The 
categorical distinctions between the political and the non-political 
and between the public and the private, then, have a long history 
of being part of, and used to justify, the exclusion of women from 
the political and public sphere. Hence they must remain suspect 
even at a time when women are formally included. Furthermore, 
there is a general tendency, even necessity, in feminist argument 
to address issues which are usually thought of as non-political and 
private because their de-politicisation and 'privatisation' is part of 
the way women's oppression was established and is reproduced. 
This necessity to re-politicise issues, hence to question the clear 



























































































- 1 2 -
and the private, is somewhat vaguely expressed in the early 
feminist slogan 'the personal is political' . 17 Feminist argument, 
then, does need to go 'beyond the political' — certainly in the 
second sense of questioning established definitions of the political. 
Arguments have also been made, however, in a different strand of 
feminist theorising about the welfare state that women need 
different social policies if they are to be equal citizens.18 Hence the 
first sense of transcending the political mentioned in the last 
section — that of extending the scope of citizen's rights to social 
rights — has been very prominent in feminist argument, too. 
Lastly, the women's movement itself provides a good example for 
the third sense, that is, the contestedness of the boundaries 
between the political and the non-political in democratic political 
communities as between various groups: as mentioned above, this 
is most notoriously illustrated by the slogan 'the personal is 
political' . 19
Secondly, with regard to the contrasts regarding the 
relation of the citizens to the state, the verdict is somewhat more 
complicated. Arguably, though, feminists are again better off on 
the thick rather than on the thin side of the contrasts. Generally, 
all feminists would agree that the state is at best a mixed blessing: 
whilst it has interfered too much with women's lives, on one hand
17 The notion of the political was unfortunately never explicitly 
discussed by feminists after Millett's famous re-definition of the 
political in her coinage of the expression 'sexual politics' (Millett 1977), 
hence what precisely the slogan meant and means is not very clear. 
The implicit tendency to question established narrow definitions of 
the political, in one way or the other, however, was very much to the 
point, and has to be understood as a response to this necessity to re­
politicise which holds more generally for oppressed groups. See, 
however, Elshtain (1981) for a defense of the value and necessity of the 
private sphere, hence for an implicit retention of the distinction. See 
also section III below.
18 Pateman (1989), Lister (1990), Fraser (1994).



























































































- 1 3 -
— in the past relegating them to the private sphere and refusing 
to grant them equal civil and political status,20 in the present still 
treating and reproducing them as dependents of breadwinners 
rather than persons in their own right21 — it has also kept too 
much out of their lives, on the other hand, denying them 
protection and redress against violence inflicted on them as in 
marital rape and wife battering, and 'special rights' such as 
maternity and child care provisions. It is also clear, however, that 
women's citizenship will not improve without the enabling hand 
of the state. Unlike marxists, feminists do not have a specifically 
feminist conception of revolution as the taking over of political 
power and are therefore dependent on the gradual change of 
existing structures to achieve their aims. Hence they depend at 
least to some extent on the state. Now some liberal feminists have 
been content with criticising the patriarchal bias of the state on the 
basis of, and with the aim of, true state neutrality,22 whilst also 
asserting the need to protect citizens' privacy.23 Even liberal 
feminists, however, are aware of the need for enlisting the help of 
the state in realising feminist goals and would like certain ideas 
embodied in state policy which would certainly challenge more 
traditional understandings of state neutrality.24 To the extent that 
they endorse this impulse, they will move towards the thick side of 
the contrasts. Other feminists, both socialist and radical, have 
generally been less wedded to the ideal of the neutrality of the 
state precisely because they recognise the need for the state in 
furthering their aims, in the case of radical feminists rather 
ironically, given their radical critique of the state as patriarchal.25 
Arguably, however, feminist thought is at its most creative and
20 Pateman (1988).
21 Pateman (1989), Fraser (1989).
22 Richards (1980), Okin (1989).
23 Okin (1991), Allen (1984).
24 Okin (1989).



























































































- 1 4 -
innovative if it leaves behind the mirage of state neutrality and 
instead starts reflecting on how the political community, including 
the state, could realise new feminist conceptions of the good life 
based on the theory of mothering and care.26
Thirdly, as far as the contrast between the 'passive' and 
'active' citizen is concerned, the verdict is somewhat ambivalent. 
The women's movement has had a strong commitment to 
participatory democracy from its very beginnings, and feminists 
have been among its most consistent supporters, most 
significantly because participatory democracy with its consensual 
models of decisionmaking gives all a real voice, women as much 
as anybody else. The stress on performance, however, weighs 
more heavily on women than on men as long as the sexual 
division of labour persists which burdens women with most of the 
unpaid care that is to be performed in any society.27 Hence the 
ideal of the active citizen, whilst already a very demanding ideal 
for men, risks becoming impossibly demanding for women unless a 
redistribution of paid and unpaid work between the sexes can be 
brought about. Furthermore, even if the ideal of the active citizen 
is to become realisable in a non-gendered way, energy and free 
time have to be much more easily available to all than they are in 
our current work-oriented Western societies.28 Note that the 
traditional solution to the problem of the scarcity of time and 
energy, endorsed by civic republicans and their predecessors, has 
always been to free some men to be active citizens by burdening
26 See Ruddick (1989), Boling (1991), Held (1993) and Tronto (1993) 
among many others. Note that the call for new impulses from 
feminist theorists does not imply the rejection of other conceptions of 
the good life, but may mean a rewriting of them in specific ways.
27 See Phillips's very detailed discussion of participatory democracy 
(Phillips 1991).
28 More concretely, both paid and unpaid work would have to be 
distributed much more evenly not only between the sexes, but also 
between those who have and those who don't have paid work, and 




























































































others . 29 Since such unequal and elitist solutions are not 
acceptable to feminists, their commitment to citizenship as 
performance will always have to be a cautious one and will have 
to be made conditional on fairly radical social changes. The most 
traditional form of 'thick' citizenship, therefore, is an ideal that 
many feminists will want to endorse, but will have to be very 
suspicious about.
Lastly, the reasons why feminists should be interested at 
least as much in citizen's obligations and virtues as they are in 
citizen's equal rights are both negative and positive. The negative 
reason relates to the formal nature of rights: whilst women's 
equal rights as citizens in all respects have been an important aim 
for feminists and have more or less been established in the 
Western democracies, their equal rights have not brought them 
substantive equality with men. At least four reactions to this 
situation are possible. One is to conclude that these equal rights 
have been interpreted in a patriarchally biased way and that an 
unbiased interpretation and application will remedy the 
problem .30 The second reaction is to argue that equal rights are 
not enough in a situation of profound social inequality and that 
special rights are needed to remedy this situation.31 I cannot do 
justice to this very controversially discussed argument, but it 
seems to me that even defenders of special rights do not 
necessarily have to focus exclusively on these. The third reaction 
is to conclude that while equal rights are important, they are also 
relatively restricted in their effectiveness and further social 
changes are needed which cannot be achieved on the basis of 
rights. This reaction moves 'beyond' rights discourse without
29 Plato is an interesting exception since he would have freed some 
women, too, even if for reasons unrelated to women themselves: See 
Okin (1979), see also her critique of Pocock's endorsement of the Greek 
ideal of citizenship (Okin 1992).




























































































- 1 6 -
rejecting it, however. The fourth reaction has recently 
increasingly attracted supporters among feminists and consists of 
a rejection of rights discourse altogether. In these writings, which 
are generally inspired by the ethic of care discussion, rights 
discourse is criticised as presupposing masculine, antagonistic 
forms of identity and social interaction. Consequently, other types 
of moral discourse are explored, mostly discourses based on 
obligations and virtues. Of these four reactions, none are 
incompatible with also looking at the thick side of obligations and 
virtues, and the last reaction would be positively in favour of it.32 
The positive reason, then, for feminists to concentrate their efforts 
on the thick side is twofold: first, obligations and virtues have not 
been explored much as yet despite being seemingly more 
promising than formal rights, and secondly, the theorisation of 
care points towards a virtue and obligations based discourse of 
citizenship. Since the theory of care has been one of the most 
productive areas of feminist work in the last few years, its 
implications for a feminist conception of citizenship deserve close 
attention.
In conclusion, feminists should mostly be interested in thick 
conceptions of citizenship, since only thick conceptions will allow 
them to focus on the kinds of problems they need to address. 
Furthermore, only thick conceptions provide space for new 
theoretical impulses which have come from outside of political 
theory but are promising to be quite productive here, too. The 
theory of care provides a good starting point for developing such 
a thick feminist conception of citizenship: not only does it 
formulate a part of social life that, although crucially necessary 
for the survival and welfare of any society, has not entered social
32 Note that a concentration on or a tendency toward the thick side does 
not necessarily exclude rights discourse altogether, even though some 
care theorists do reject it (e.g. Noddings 1984, 1989). It may, however, 
relegate rights discourse and citizens' rights to a less prominent place 



























































































- 1 7 -
and political theory, it also provides a substantially different 
perspective on social and political life. In the following, I shall 
counter Dietz's critique of maternal or carer's citizenship and 
indicate how links between care and citizenship can be made.
Ill — The link between care and citizenship
Before I look at the possible links between the theory of care 
and citizenship, I have to address an argument which, if valid, 
would make the attempt to 'translate' private practices, 
understandings and values — such as those of mothering or care 
— into public and political ones seem utterly foolish and 
misguided. The argument, pursued at length by Dietz in her 
critique of Elshtain's and Ruddick's advocacy of maternal 
thinking, 33 is that the maternal and the political consist of distinct 
activities, hence that no such translation is possible: mothering 'is
33 See, among others, Elshtain (1981, 1982), Ruddick (1989). Note that 
Ruddick's book, Maternal Thinking (1989), which appeared much 
later, consists of an in-depth development of the ideas presented in 
the three papers on which Dietz bases her critique (Ruddick 1980, 
1983a, 1983b). Ruddick (1989) illustrates at least implicitly many of the 
points I make against Dietz below. It is also worth noting that only 
Ruddick is a 'pure' theorist of maternal thinking. In Elshtain's work, 
by contrast, there is a rather unfortunate confusion between two types 
of argument which are given very different amounts of attention: the 
first consists of a defense of the value of the family and the private 
sphere and is foregrounded in most of Elshtain's writing; the second 
type is more narrowly about maternal thinking, but is much less well 
developed by Elshtain than it is by Ruddick. It is deplorable that Dietz 
has focused her critique of 'maternal citizenship' on the much more 
sketchy Elshtain texts rather than Ruddick's work which, even in the 
earlier papers, is much more substantial and less easy to reject. Dietz 
can, however, be read not just as a critique of Elshtain's barely 
developed 'theory' of maternal thinking, but as a much more general 
critique of a particular argumentative move in feminist theory, that is, 
that of using insights from the theory of mothering and care in the 
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an intimate, exclusive, and particular activity. ... Democratic 
citizenship, on the other hand, is collective, inclusive, and 
generalized ' . 34 Dietz's critique, based on an Arendtian type of 
civic republicanism, is obviously inspired by the categorical 
distinction between the political and the non-political typical of 
civic republican thought. I have argued generally against this 
distinction in section II, but it is worth meeting Dietz's specific 
points in the context of a discussion of how a translation from the 
private into the public is possible.35
Dietz's main point is that a good mother does not 
necessarily make a good citizen, because a citizen's activities and 
virtues are distinct and exclusive to political discussion and action 
and can only be learnt in the public sphere. Does the fact that 
mothering or caring and political action have some contrasting 
properties mean that they cannot be informed by the same virtues 
and values? This clearly does not follow. Honesty, to take a 
neutral example, is as much of a virtue in the public as in the 
private sphere (and equally lacking in both), and peace is equally 
undeniably a value in both spheres, even if its interpretation 
changes between the spheres. Both virtues and values, therefore, 
can be appropriate in various social spheres or settings as long as 
they are general enough and a fitting interpretation for these 
particular spheres can be found. The interesting trait of virtues is 
that they are dispositions to act in certain ways, and that these 
dispositions can be exhibited across a wide range of different 
situations, hence also, at least in principle, public and private ones. 
Similarly, whether values are valid in particular spheres or 
situations depends on whether they are general enough and
34 Dietz (1985), p. 31.
35 Although Dietz focuses on mothering, most of her arguments apply to 
care, too, hence are important to be met. As will become obvious 
further on, my own argument about care is made somewhat easier by 
the fact that a focus on care avoids at least some of the problems which 



























































































- 1 9 -
whether they can be shown to apply. Rather than assert apriori 
incompatibility on the basis of a categorical distinction, therefore, 
Dietz would need to show that the particular virtues and values 
characteristic of mothering or caring are not appropriate for the 
domain of politics. As I shall point out below, on the contrary, the 
values and especially the virtues of care are more than 
appropriate for and hitherto unacknowledged and lacking in 
modern democratic politics.
A further argument relates to the link maternal thinkers and 
care theorists are trying to establish between mothering or caring 
and citizenship. Dietz's objection is threefold. First, she argues 
that in order to link maternal thinking with politics, one would 
have to 'show that maternal virtues are conceptually connected 
to, or that the social practice of mothering causally brings about, 
democratic values — particularly active citizenship, self- 
government, egalitarianism, and the exercise of freedom ' . 36 
Secondly, she claims that no political standards or values can be 
derived from mothering either, since the 'moral imperative of 
mothering' — the preservation and growth of children — is too 
specific to lead to any guidelines for political decisions. Thirdly, 
she maintains that even if there were links, they would not affect 
politics proper. Now the first objection clearly demands too much: 
the link between mothering or caring and citizenship does not 
have to be conceptual or causal, it can equally validly consist of a 
link through virtues, skills or values that are appropriate in both 
spheres of action. The onus, of course, lies on the maternal thinker 
or care theorist to point out what kinds of links there are.37 
Dietz's second objection, demanding, more weakly, a derivative
36 Dietz (1985), p. 30, my emphases.
37 Ruddick devotes two chapters of her book on reflecting on the link 
between maternal practice and thinking and political values and 
activism, specifically peace politics (Ruddick 1989). Tronto (1993) traces 
some of the values and virtues of care in democratic politics. See also 
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link of the kind I asserted in my reply to the first objection, does not 
hold either. First, much more general values than that of the 
preservation and growth of children can be derived from 
mothering, such as the value of peace and of certain types of 
conflict resolution, and these values certainly are relevant for at 
least certain political issues, notably peace politics.38 Secondly, 
care, given that it is a more general practice than mothering, also 
implies more general values such as, e.g., the importance of the 
meeting of needs, which, in turn, will lead to certain political 
imperatives like the importance of the welfare state. 
Furthermore, as I shall point out below, other types of derivative 
links are possible, such as through particular contents, virtues and 
generalised perspectives. Some of these links have been drawn by 
maternal thinkers and care theorists since Dietz's critique, 39 but 
further work in this area needs to be done to substantiate my 
points against Dietz. Dietz's claim, then, thirdly, that 'the only 
effective challenge to a corrupt or injust state is one that is itself 
expressly political' 40 is based on two wrong assumptions: first, it 
assumes apriori that no derivate links can be made between 
maternal thinking and care (which, according to her, are non­
political) and the political sphere;41 secondly, it assumes that, even 
if such links could be made, nothing of relevance could be said. I 
have argued above that such links can be made, hence what 
remains to be pointed out is the fact that relevant claims can be 
made based on such links. An obvious example, specifically in 
response to her claim, are arguments care theorists make about an 
insufficient and therefore unjust welfare state.42 Note, however, 
that Dietz's challenge is based on a very narrow definition of 
politics as about the state and political institutions. Whilst I am
38 Ruddick (1989).
39 See notes 26 above and 42 below.
40 Dietz (1985), p. 34.
41 See her first argument.
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happy to concede that some of the values in the political sphere 
may be specific to this sphere, notably those concerned with the 
evaluation of political institutions themselves, I do not think her 
narrow definition of politics should be accepted: politics is as much 
about the state as it is about political decisionmaking, and the 
latter is always based on more general values, some or most of 
which may be informed by maternal thinking or care theory. Also, 
the question of relevance is difficult to settle independently of 
specific arguments, since a claim to relevancy is obviously part and 
parcel of any specific linkage care theorists and maternal thinkers 
make (which in itself might challenge established definitions of the 
political43). In conclusion, then, Dietz's objections against links 
between mothering or care and the political sphere do not hold, 
but the burden of elaborating these links clearly lies on maternal 
thinkers and care theorists.
Lastly, in order to reinforce her argument about the strict 
separateness of the two spheres of mothering and politics and the 
activities associated with them, Dietz points to the differences in 
the relationships that obtain between mothers and children and 
between citizen: the former are unequal and characterised by 
exclusive love, whilst the latter are equal and characterised by 
Aristotelian friendship or mutual respect.44 Now nobody could 
possibly deny that there are such differences, although the extent 
and content of the differences is socially and historically variable, 
of course.45 I also share with Dietz the unease about the power
43 See my argument in section II.
44 Dietz (1985), p. 31f.
45 It may be worth noting in this context that the Aristotelian friendship 
and equality between citizens was no doubt possible in the Greek city 
states because of the very exclusiveness and hence homogeneity (and 
relatively small size) of the group of citizens, comprising an elite of 
fairly wealthy men only. Real equality, as opposed to formal equality, 
has become a problem ever since democratic citizenship has been 
widened to include most or all adult members of a political 
community, that is, ever since social divisions have come to
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hierarchy implicit in a mothering relationship, if this is taken as a 
model for relationships and inferences in the public sphere. It is 
furthermore possible that the emotions connected with mothering 
may be too strong and too exclusive to allow a transfer, although 
it may be argued that too exclusive a type of mothering, and 
certainly of caring, represents a corruption of the practice rather 
than the ideal type.46 These points, however, do not imply that 
'private' practices and relationships cannot serve as resources for 
political reflection, but simply that mothering may be 
inappropriate.47 I think they represent good reasons for choosing 
care rather than mothering as the basis for a feminist approach to 
citizenship, since care neither presupposes the relatively lasting 
power inequalities, nor the close emotional bond that mothering 
presup p oses . 48 Care, in other words, whilst sharing many 
characteristics with mothering, is more general a practice than 
mothering — mothering being a particular type of caring — and 
therefore better suited for making the link with citizenship. Whilst 
endorsing to some extent Dietz's objections against mothering, 
then, I do not think these objections hold against caring, hence 
leave the care theorist free to develop her approach to citizenship.
In conclusion, although Dietz's arguments fail, the onus 
probandi lies on the side of care theorists (and maternal thinkers): 
their work has to show how the translation from care or
counteract the political and legal equality of citizens. Modern 
democratic theory has not been able to deal with this problem, it seems 
to me, because it posits equality where there is obvious inequality. 
Hence looking at the morality of hierarchical but dynamic 
relationships such as mothering, and at equality as an end-result and 
hard-won achievement in such unequal relationships — rather than 
falsely assuming equality — may not be such a bad theoretical strategy 
after all! (See also note 47.)
46 See Bubeck (1995).
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mothering into citizenship is possible. In the following section, I 
shall indicate how such translation can be done.
IV — Care as a resource for citizenship
Four different types of translation from care to the sphere of 
politics and citizenship strike me as important. I shall present 
them and give examples from the theory of care or mothering. 
None of these different types are exclusive, and are likely to be 
found combined.
First, private concerns or contents may be translated into 
public ones.49 Carers may claim their concerns to be, and argue 
for them to become accepted as, public ones, hence what is on the 
political agenda may change as a result of the intervention of 
carers in politics, based on concerns derived from their experience 
as carers. These may, but need not be, specific or sectional 
concerns.50 Carers may, for example, refuse to accept any longer
49 I use 'private' here to refer to the experiences, concerns, values, virtues 
and conceptions which form part of the caring practice of individual 
carers or mothers, and 'public' to refer to the sphere of politics and 
citizenship, without, however, wanting to imply a fixed dichotomy 
between private and public. Note also that similar experiences, 
concerns, etc. form part of public care (Bubeck 1995).
50 Phillips (1993) seems to think that feminist interests are necessarily 
sectional interests — hence that feminist politics are necessarily 
interest group politics — by contrasting these with the general point of 
view that citizens should take, and affirming the latter. I do not think 
that concerns which may be derived from the experiences of a 
particular group, in this case women, are necessarily sectional, that is, 
not general: if a society has solved a given social problem by making 
one particular group responsible for dealing with it, members of this 
group will have a particularly good grasp of what the problem is and 
may make it into one of their political priorities (apart from also 
having an interest in it being seen as a general social problem). The 
problem, however, has always been a general one. The provision of 
day-to-day care for those in need, and the upbringing of children more 
specifically, are cases in point: feminists may have a specific interest in
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that problems they have with combining paid work with unpaid 
care are their private problems and call for public support for their 
efforts, or even for society to take more responsibility for the 
provision of care to those in need. Likewise, the gendered 
distribution of paid and unpaid work, which burdens women with 
most of the unpaid care, may be claimed to be an issue of social 
justice.51 It might also be argued that the practice of care should 
be acknowledged as and made into a general citizen's obligation: 
no society can survive, let alone flourish, without the care that all 
citizens need at various stages in their lives and in various ways. 
Given that care is so central to any society, and given, 
furthermore, that the practice of care may function as an 
education in important virtues which are also important for 
citizens to have, all citizens should contribute their fair share of 
care to the general welfare of society. This type of translation, 
then, will often follow the general feminist impulse of re­
politicising what are now perceived to be wrongly or even 
oppressively de-politicised rather than truly private issues; or it 
may simply bring to public awareness issues that would relatively 
easily be accepted as political but are not widely known or even 
actively suppressed, as the example of the Argentinian and 
Chilean madres protesting against the 'disappearances' of their 
children or that of the German mothers protesting against 
contaminated food after Czernobyl illustrate.52 In principle, there 
is no topic, and no concern, that can, and in a democracy may, 
apriori be excluded from the political agenda (short of the domain 
of those things that it is beyond human capacities to change), and
pressing these issues politically, but the problem of the provision of 
care for those in need is a general social problem that all societies have 
to solve in one way or another, and that some solve better, more 
humanely and justly than others.
51 Boling (1991), Bubeck (1995).
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this in turn implies that translations from private into public will 
always be possible.
Secondly, private values may become public ones, hence the 
values which inform political reflection and by which political 
alternatives or decisions are judged may be derived from values 
endorsed by carers and informing their practice of care. Ruddick's 
work on how maternal thinking translates into peace politics is a 
good instance of how carers' or mothers' values, notably the 
preservation of life, can be translated into a commitment to peace 
and a general suspicion of the 'imperative' to arm and of easy 
justifications of war.53 Also, the value of meeting needs, which 
guides any form of care, can be seen as a more general value 
which informs not only one's understanding of the point and 
functioning of society and social interaction, but also underpins 
the philosophy of the welfare state.54 Lastly, the value of 
openness in a carer to the demands made by those in need can be 
translated into a value that should inform political interaction and 
the nature of democratic political institutions: openness and 
accessibility of a political system to all who want to voice their 
concerns, and the openness of participants in public discussion to 
different points of view and different needs and interests, as
53 Ruddick (1989). Davion (1990) has argued against a link between 
pacifism and care. I do not find her argument convincing, though, 
partly because she uses the kind of paradoxical dilemmas that arise 
from any doctrine — such as situations where mothers are only able to 
save their children's lives, or only able to bring about peace, by using 
violence (these dilemmas being comparable to those about the 
toleration of anti- or illiberals in liberalism) — and partly because her 
interpretation of pacifism is too strict. Mothers or carers can be 
pacifists by tendency, without having to abjure all use of violence. If 
understood as implying claims about pacifism as a general tendency or 
a general disposition rather than an absolute principle, Ruddick's 
argument holds against Davion's critique. Regardless of what in the 
dispute one finds plausible, however, the implication in both Ruddick 
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opposed to narrowly sectional lobbying and politicking may 
change the nature of politics, both of discussion and of outcomes, 
considerably. Whether and how the values of care can be 
transferred from private to public, then, depends mostly on 
whether the values implicit in the practice of care are 
generalisable, and whether a valid interpretation for them can be 
found in the sphere of politics.
Thirdly, private virtues and skills arising from and 
informing the practice of care can be argued to be relevant and 
important in citizens, too. Thus the attentiveness to another 
person's reality, needs and interests which characterises a good 
carer may be crucially important in modern democratic political 
communities in which social divisions lead to radically different 
realities, needs and interests:55 substantive equality can only be 
achieved if such differences are truly understood and taken into 
consideration in political decisions. Real attention to others, that 
is, the capacity to listen and take in what others, different from us, 
say in the political process, is a necessary precondition of any such 
efforts. Furthermore, the ability to acknowledge such different 
realities is as important between carer and cared for as it is in 
public discourse: such acknowledgement creates a sense of shared 
understanding and shared reality, as opposed to desperation 
about not being heard on one side and anger about others 
continually 'going on about something' on the other, and thus 
allows truly consensual solutions which deflect tension and 
conflict. Such acknowledgement may be especially important 
politically in a situation where part of the oppression of some 
groups consists in public silence, marginalisation or even 
suppression or criminalisation of their lives.56 Lastly, the ability to 
respond creatively and imaginatively to seemingly impossible
55 Tronto (1993).
56 This point seems particularly relevant in the case of 'differently abled', 
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dilemmas which is crucial in a good carer may equally well inform 
more imaginative and creative political solutions. Dilemmas arise 
from seemingly incompatible principles, claims or interests, in 
political negotiation and conflict resolution as much as in day-to- 
day care, and the ability to remain flexible about the interpretation 
and application of one's deeply held principles and values, 
together with an imaginative and creative approach to such 
situations, may make for better politics than most of us are used 
to. Whether and how the virtues of care can be transferred into 
the political sphere, then, depends on whether their relevance and 
usefulness can be shown. Generally, there seems to me a fairly 
strong case for most carer's virtues being understood as political 
virtues, too, because both care and politics are 'muddling through' 
types of activities which involve the welfare of others, hence 
whose outcomes are crucial: it is hardly possible to make a perfect 
job of either, but a lot depends on how well people know how to 
'muddle through', and that in turn depends on their having 
acquired certain interactive and problem solving skills or virtues.
Lastly, private understandings may become public ones. 
Feminist standpoint theorists have claimed for a while that the 
fact that the practice of care is more or less exclusively relegated 
to women via the sexual division of labour allows women access 
to a type of experience and knowledge that is closed off to those 
who do not engage in this practice.57 Carers, according to this 
type of argument, have an intimate knowledge of human need and 
the dependency such need invariably creates, a knowledge which 
contrasts strongly with, and throws doubt on, the assumption of 
autonomy and independence characterising both mainstream 
political theory and politics. Also, models of conflict resolution 
derived from mothering may look quite different and be more
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adequate than those of strategic realists.58 More generally, the 
wealth of human experience and the sources of knowledge which 
carers can bring to the political sphere might, if spelt out more 
systematically, alter considerably the way politics, the nature and 
purpose of the political community, as well as citizenship itself are 
conceived of. Reflection about these topics is at least mediately 
influenced by our implicit or explicit theories of human nature, 
society, social interaction and moral beliefs and values. If there is 
reason to believe that those of carers are systematically different 
from those of non-carers, there is also reason to believe that 
carers as citizens — provided they do not leave their knowledge as 
carers behind when entering the public sphere, as Dietz, like many 
civic republicans and also liberals would want them to do — will 
bring to the polity an important and valid contribution that is only 
starting to be realised as a potential resource in political theory.
In conclusion, much work remains to be done to flesh out a 
feminist approach to citizenship based on a theory of care. I have 
only been able to sketch some preliminary argument, making a 
case for the 'thick' shape such a theory should take (section II), 
defending the possibility of translation from care to the political 
sphere (section III), and pointing out four types of such translation 
(section IV). I hope that further work on citizenship drawing on 
the theory of care will advance the general project which I hope I 
have shown to be worthwile. In the last section, I will look in 
more detail at a specific example of a translation of the care 
perspective into the sphere of citizenship.
V — Care as a citizen's obligation
One of the suggestions I made when discussing the 
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perspectives into public ones was that of a revised conception of 
citizenship in which the performance of her or his share of care 
has become a general citizen's obligation.59 So far, I have 
argued that a feminist conception of citizenship should be thick 
rather than thin, and that the theory of care provides an 
interesting and challenging resource for conceiving of citizenship 
thickly and in new ways. The suggestion of a general citizen's 
duty to care can be seen as the converging point between my 
argument in this paper and the feminist critique of existing 
conceptions of citizenship. Two main points of this critique which 
can be found in most feminist writings on citizenship are the 
following. First, women have historically been excluded from 
citizenship, and even though this exclusion has formally been 
ended, they remain excluded in more subtle ways.60 They remain 
excluded in these more subtle ways because, secondly, the concept 
of citizenship retains a patriarchal bias or remains based on the 
male citizen.61 This male and/or patriarchal bias has its historical 
origins in the exclusion of women, of course, but the question now 
is how this bias should be dealt with. Pateman has represented 
this problem as the same already faced by Wollstonecraft in her 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman and therefore termed it 
'Wollstonecraft's dilemma'. Given the patriarchal, male bias in 
conceptions of citizenship, feminists and women seem to have two 
equally unacceptable choices:
either women become (like) men, and so full citizens; or they 
continue at women's work, which is of no value for citizenship.62
Now the way out of dilemmas is always the same: since there are 
only unacceptable conclusions, one has to reject the premises from
59 The terms 'duty' and 'obligation' are used interchangeably in this 
argument.
60 Pateman (1989), Vogel (1991).
61 Pateman (1989), Hartsock (1984).
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which they are deducted, or the terms on which the whole 
argument or presentation of the dilemma is based. The crucial 
term in question in Wollstonecraft's dilemma is the patriarchal 
conception of citizenship. Hence Pateman concludes that the 
important point is to reconsider 'women's contribution as citizens 
and the meaning of citizenship'.63 She does not make any more 
specific suggestions, however, as to what such reconsideration 
might lead to.64
In the light of Wollstonecraft's dilemma, my argument in the 
last two sections can then be understood as preparing the ground 
for and making some suggestions towards just such a 
reconsideration of citizenship on the basis of the theory of care. 
Whilst I am not claiming that this would be the only possible route, 
I do want to propose that it is a very promising route. Many of 
the suggestions in the last section could be followed up to be 
composed into a new conception of citizenship. Instead of doing 
so, however, I would like to pursue one central idea in more detail 
which, among other things, would certainly allow us to escape 
Wollstonecraft's dilemma: that of conceiving of care as a general 
citizen's duty.
63 Pateman (1989), p. 203.
64 She has also subsequently focused on women's differential 
incorporation as quasi or second-class citizens in virtue of their 
motherhood: as mothers, they are to bear, give birth to, and raise 
future citizens, whilst also being subjected to men as heads of 
households (Pateman 1992). The conclusion of her argument here is 
not anymore the need for a changed conception of citizenship, but the 
need for citizenship to be of 'equal worth to [both sexes] as women and 
men' (Pateman 1992, p. 28). By this she means that free relations 
between the sexes have to replace patriarchal relations which 
subordinate women and that sexual difference has to be compatible 
with substantial equality (p.29). She thus seems to have taken a 
completely different turn which leads her to focus on social relations 
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What would it mean to conceive of care as a general citizen's 
duty? It would mean that the performance of care is part of what 
it means or what is implied by being a member of a political 
community. Thus minimally and rather abstractly, it would be 
expected of each adult citizen that she or he engage in their share 
of care at some point in her or his life. Now so far, this idea might 
not be very controversial since even most men will, on some 
minimalist understanding of care, engage in care.65 If we restrict 
care, however, to those kinds of activities which meet basic human 
needs in other persons who depend on others to meet those needs 
— such as those for food, physical comfort, security, human 
warmth and understanding, in short all those activities which 
make life livable for those not able to fight for themselves66 — we 
have to face up to the current gendered reality of such care: most 
of this kind of basic human care is to date performed by women.67 
Moreover, as has been suggested often enough, it is precisely the 
fact that women perform this care in the private sphere that also 
explains why women have not been able to be as present as men in 
the public spheres of paid work and politics, hence why they are at 
a disadvantage with regard to their role as active citizens. Care, 
therefore, because it is such a gendered practice, lies also at the
65 Tronto (1993), e.g., defines care as a practice 'aimed at maintaining, 
continuing, or repairing the world' (p. 104). According to this 
definition, men who, very gender stereotypically, do repairs in their 
home, must be admitted to be engaging in care. According to my own 
much narrower definition of care, however, care consists of face-to- 
face activities which meet needs that those in need could not possibly 
meet themselves (see Bubeck (1995), ch. IV). Hence men doing repairs 
and women cooking meals for their husbands would be providing 
services, but not care, whilst those looking after children, infirm 
elderly, sick or otherwise needy people, e.g., would be engaging in care.
66 'Those not able to fight for themselves' is not a fixed category: it 
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heart of the problem of women's citizenship.68 The conception and 
implementation of care as a general citizen's duty, however, 
would change the social and political parameters of citizenship as 
well as of care very dramatically: it would make the performance 
of care a public question instead of a private problem, and it would 
make it the responsibility of all citizens, instead of burdening some 
— that is, mostly women — with it and freeing others — mostly 
men — from it. This conception of care as a general citizen's duty 
is also obviously part of a thick conception of citizenship: it puts a 
stress on citizens' obligations and the performance of certain 
activities (in our case, care), it transcends prevalent notions of the 
political by making the performance of care in general a political 
issue and by linking care to the very meaning of membership in a 
political community, and, as we shall see below, it perceives the 
state as having an enabling and supportive role in this respect, 
actively endorsing care as a good for the community. It also 
conceives of the provision of care as one of the preconditions of 
the flourishing of any political community, hence makes it a valid 
topic for discussing citizenship.
Why, though, should care be a general citizen's obligation? 
Does it not really and properly belong into the private sphere, as 
an activity that is fitting and appropriate to the more or less 
intimate relations of members of a family or friends? Why should 
it be 'torn away' from that sphere? Since I have responded to this 
question elsewhere,69 I shall only point out here that there is 
already a lot of public care in most advanced, industrialised
68 As mentioned in note 64 above, Pateman (1992) has suggested that the 
problem is not simply that women have been excluded as citizens (as 
she argued in Pateman 1989), but also that they have been inscribed 
into a secondary and privatised form of citizenship as mothers. 
Responding to this argument would lead too far afield from the 
present train of thought, but it seems to me at any rate that agreement 
to these points does not vitiate any of the arguments I am making 
below.
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societies, hence that we have already come to accept the idea and 
the validity of such care. Moreover, the acceptability of my 
proposal will largely depend on the extent and the details of the 
changes implied by a general citizens' obligation to care. Before 
addressing such detail below, I shall give a general defense of the 
proposal first. This defense is based on the following 
considerations.
First, note that, in the past, but also to date, the most 
prominent citizen's obligation — apart from the obligation to obey 
the law70 — has been the defense of one's country in the case of 
war. This obligation was and still is gendered, since women are 
generally not called upon to fight, and are not admitted into 
combat even if they are admitted into the army. Citizenship, 
therefore, given that its meaning is at least partly determined by 
what are seen as a citizen's obligations, has clearly excluded, and 
still does exclude, women in a very straightforward sense and 
thus makes them into lesser citizens: citizens who will not be 
allowed to perform what are generally agreed to be citizens' 
duties. Moreover, given that women are on the whole excluded 
from this responsibility, the inclusion of this responsibility into the 
conception of citizenship also biases its meaning against women. 
Whilst men are publically praised and celebrated for performing 
their duties, women do not get mentioned at all. Why, however, 
should the excellence of war heroes in the defense of one's 
community be publically celebrated and the service even of the 
nameless many in war be publically recognised, if the service of 
those who contribute every day to the welfare and flourishing of 
all members of the community remains unsung? It might be 
objected, of course, that the latter kind of service is recognised on 
mother's day. But, first, it is not seen as a citizen's obligation, 
hence not comparable to that celebrated in soldiers, and secondly,
70 But see Parekh (1993) for an interesting argument that the obligation 




























































































- 3 4 -
it cements women's place in the home and hence retains and 
perpetuates the deeply gendered division between the 'true' male 
citizens whose service is celebrated as a citizen's service, and the 
lesser female citizens whose service may be recognised, but does 
not carry with it the same public valorisation and privileges.71 
Thirdly, it also recognises mothering only — which is a specific 
form of care and certainly very important — but leaves out other, 
equally valid and important forms of care. The inclusion of the 
performance of care into the conception of citizenship as an 
obligation of all citizens, therefore, changes two very important 
things: First, it transforms care from a 'handicap' for women into 
a general requirement, and secondly, it thus 'unbiases' or 
rebalances the male bias still inherent in conceptions of citizenship. 
By contrast, the full admission of women into the army and even 
combat would 'unbias' citizenship only in that it would endorse the 
first alternative of Wollstonecraft's dilemma, that of women being 
allowed to become (like) men, but it would not tackle the 
distribution of care as a public issue. Arguably, the latter will be at 
least as important a change as the former.
Secondly, by including care into its conception of what it 
means to be one of its members, a community also gives care the 
public recognition as a necessary activity that it rightfully should 
have. Thus the traditional distinction in the celebration of citizen 
war heroes and private mothers also indicates something about 
the values held in such a community: its defense is important 
enough to be made into a public duty, but the welfare of its 
members is not. Should any community not value both types of 
service at least equally, however, or rather value caring more 
than warring, since its very survival depends on care for its future 
generations, and its flourishing depends mostly on the quality of 
life its citizens are able to assure not only for themselves but also 




























































































- 3 5 -
however, this should be expressed in its conception of citizenship, 
hence care should as much be an obligation of citizens as war has 
always been recognised to be. Seen from a historical perspective, 
it is only the continued burdening of women with care whilst 
excluding them from citizenship at the same time that can explain 
why care has not been given the central place in conceptions of 
citizenship that it rightly deserves. Making care central to 
citizenship, then, is for any community an expression of its 
recognition of the central importance of care to its own survival 
and flourishing, and through this recognition also a recognition of 
women's traditional contribution.
Thirdly, making care into a citizen's obligation would also 
allow the beginnings of a solution to the sexual division of labour 
which distributes unpaid care and paid work very unevenly 
between men and women and thus leads to distributive injustice 
with regard to both free time as a resource and material 
resources.72 Given that men and women would then have an 
equal obligation as citizens to care, unpaid care could then not 
hinder women specifically from participating in the public sphere: 
if care were to take men's and women's time equally, it would 
create an equal starting position for both men and women with 
regard to their engagement in other activities, be they public or 
private, paid or unpaid.
Fourthly, as an implication of the third point, the distributive 
injustice of women's unequal burdening with unpaid care and 
comparable lack of opportunity to engage in paid work could thus 
be tackled, too: the most important hurdle to have taken in this 
respect would have been the transformation of care into a public 
issue and the recognition of women's unequal burdening with it. 
The recognition of the existence of an unjust situation is always 
the most important step. How it is to be remedied remains, of 
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general citizen's obligation would be that men and women should 
share in the care that has to be done in a society equally.73
Fifthly, it educates women and, more importantly, 
reeducates men in virtues and skills which are crucial to the 
creation and maintenance of social cohesion, the general welfare 
of society, and, according to my argument in the preceding section, 
even their participation in the political sphere. As such, it would 
also contribute to the correction of the worst effects of the 
possessive and competitive individualism and atomism that has 
characterised modern capitalist democracies74 and reduced the 
understanding of citizenship to an exclusive focus on rights.75
Sixthly, depending on its implementation, care as a citizen's 
obligation may also help to solve the crisis of the welfare state and 
problems of youth unemployment.76
If there are so many good reasons for endorsing the 
inclusion of care in the concept of citizenship, the further question 
is how it would have to be implemented in order to have those 
beneficial effects. Now it is clear that a mere inscription of care as 
an obligation into the concept of citizenship is not strong enough
73 It may thus also be seen to solve the problem of women's 
subordination as carers that Pateman (1992) stresses as most central: by 
making care a general responsibility, women are equally burdened as 
men, and hence equally free (or unfree) to engage in other activities.
74 See Held (1993).
75 Communitarians have criticised modern liberal democracies in a 
similar vein, but have sought the source of new and alternative 
values in the community, which is not necessarily a source of 
liberating values for women: see Friedman (1989,1991) and Frazer and 
Lacey (1993), but also Walzer (1994) for a communitarian response.
76 German welfare services, both in the public and voluntary sector, 
depend heavily on the contribution of conscientious objectors who 
perform two years of a kind of 'caring' service instead of 15 months of 
service in the army. See also Piachaud (1991) for an argument that one 
response to the crisis of the welfare state is to 'conscript labour as a 



























































































- 3 7 -
to bring about much change.77 If all the beneficial effects 
presented above are to occur, there have to be ways of 
implementing this obligation which make the performance of care 
a reality for both men and women. My suggestion, therefore, is 
the creation of a caring service into which adult men and women 
are conscripted upon reaching majority or at some other point in 
their lives. This caring service might exist alongside or as an 
alternative to service in the army, or be the only citizens' service 
whilst the army is professionalised. What such a service would 
achieve in any society, apart from its educating aspect for those 
who perform it, would be the possibility of public provision of care 
as an alternative any carer can rely on as and when needed. Care 
would thus become much more visibly part of the public life of a 
community, and also solve the injustice of unpaid carers' 
exploitation.78 We might think about whether it would be 
admissible for some to buy themselves out of their obligation, or 
whether some might be made to perform alternative types of 
service — such as, e.g. community maintenance and improvement 
services — instead if there is some doubt as to whether the 
welfare of vulnerable human beings can be entrusted to them. The 
'voluntary social year', during which volunteers work in welfare 
institutions to provide care, exists already in various European 
countries, and the idea of alternative, community oriented types of 
national service has been voiced by others.79 Nobody has yet 
dreamed up the idea of a caring service, but what would be wrong 
with it if so much could be got right through it?
77 Men in the former GDR had the obligation to contribute an equal 
share of domestic work according to the GDR constitution. This 
obligation did not prevent a fairly marked and very traditional sexual 
division of labour to continue in GDR families.
78 Bubeck (1995).
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